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 Since September 11, 2001, the environments in which law enforcement agencies 
operate have been changing. Contingency theory hypothesizes that an organization adapts 
to their environment through organizational structure and contingencies to accomplish a 
state of fit or higher performance. Utilizing contingency theory, the study addressed two 
research questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the 
necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to the next terrorist attack? (2) 
How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism 
preparedness? A sample of 902 county and municipal law enforcement agencies from the 
East Central region of the United States was surveyed. A total of 522 electronic surveys 
were sent to municipal and county agencies across 5 states. The remaining 380 agencies 
were sent physical survey copies. 
 The study found that law enforcement agencies believe they have the necessary 
resources and training to respond to and/or prevent a terrorist attack. Perceived terrorist 
risk was found to be a weak but negative predictor of preparedness. The study concluded 
that funding, risk, and structure did influence an agency’s level of terrorism preparedness.
  
 Overall, the contingency theory framework helped explain terrorism preparedness 
among law enforcement agencies.  
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Since the tragic day of September 11th 2001, law enforcement agencies have been 
tasked with the new role of terrorism preparedness. As the probability of a terrorist attack 
increases, so does the pressure for law enforcement to be prepared. This is evident with 
the sharp upsurge of terrorist attacks around the world (University of Maryland, 2014). 
Acts of terrorism have been around for centuries, dating back to the assassination of 
Julius Caesar. However, terrorist attacks have occurred more frequently in the 21st 
century. In 2013, there were 12,000 terrorist attacks worldwide (University of Maryland, 
2014). Due to the increase of terrorist attacks over recent years, it has become vital for 
law enforcement to understand what is considered as an act of terrorism.  
However, terrorism is hard to define. There are multiple definitions and 
interpretations conceptualizing the subject. Research suggests the definition of terrorism 
is vague at best (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Riley & Hoffman, 1995; Ganor, 2002). 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that survey respondents’ answers generated over 109 
different definitions of terrorism. The lack of a universal, agreed upon definition, leaves 
police agencies operating under a definition that fits their role in terrorism prevention and 
preparedness. A perceived increase in the severity and frequency of attacks, coupled with 
a loose interpretation of the term terrorism, has made it difficult to assess whether police 
agencies are ready for future attacks. This became evident when police communication 
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and cooperation came under scrutiny after September 11th. There were “turf battles and 
the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement 
community”; (Downing, 2009, p.3) which ultimately led to a failure in key law 
enforcement functions.  
Historically, the role of terrorism prevention and preparedness fell to the United 
States government. It was not until the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Act of 1996 was passed that state and local law enforcement began to play a vital role in 
terrorism preparedness (Combating Terrorism, 2002). By recognizing the need for state 
and local law enforcement to assist federal law enforcement, it has become necessary for 
police agencies to be trained and equipped with the tools to combat terrorism at the local 
level.  
State and local law enforcement agencies have recently been propelled into the 
media limelight due to the military type of weaponry they have been seen using during 
recent altercations between police and the public. It has brought forth many questions 
regarding how police agencies were able to obtain such military equipment. The 
Department of Defense’s 1033 Program has provided many law enforcement agencies 
across the United States with military equipment at little to no cost to the local agency 
(Else, 2014). Even though the 1033 Program has been the main source for military 
equipment for law enforcement, there has been other federal funding available for 
agencies to help them comply with their role in counterterrorism. At the end of 2011, the 
Department of Homeland Security paid out more than $2 billion dollars in anti-terror 
grants (Becker & Shulz, 2011). To properly acquire and distribute these grants, plans and 
policies must be in place for terrorism preparedness to be effective.  
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Planning is an essential part of terrorism preparedness. Riley and Hoffman (1995) 
looked at state and local law enforcement and their level of preparedness. The study 
found that only 38 percent of state law enforcement had some type of contingency plan 
for dealing with the threat of terrorism. Of the local law enforcement agencies surveyed, 
Riley and Hoffman (1995) found that 52 percent had a contingency plan to deal with a 
terrorist event within their jurisdiction.  
Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this study was to confirm and expand upon recent research on 
terrorism preparedness through the lens of contingency theory. Specifically, the current 
study determined if the contingency theory framework helped explain the extent to which 
law enforcement agencies were prepared for the next terrorist attack. By drawing from 
contingency theory, the study helped identify trends within the region and helped 
understand how law enforcement agencies prepared for a terrorist attack within their 
community.  
Contingency theory posits that an organization must adapt to their environment to 
survive and achieve high performance (Woodward, 1965; Donaldson, 2001). There are 
three core elements that make up contingency theory: (1) contingencies, (2) 
organizational structure, and (3) a proper fit between contingencies and organizational 
structure (Donaldson, 2001). A balance between contingencies and organizational 
structure will lead to a proper fit or high performance. It is important for law enforcement 
agencies to maintain a high level of performance to keep the community they serve safe. 
When there is a poor fit between organizational structure and contingencies within an 
agency, it leads to poor performance which, in turn, could cause confusion or even failure 
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of the agency. In other words, when a law enforcement agency is unable to maintain a 
high level of performance, it can lead to confusion, misconduct, and poor public support. 
There have been many studies that have taken the idea of contingency theory and have 
applied it to policing (Langworthy, 1985; Crank & Wells, 1991; Maguire, 2003; Davis et 
al., 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 
2010; Zhao, Ren, Lovrich, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). 
Crank and Wells (1991) and Maguire (2003) found that organizational size was a 
significant predictor of organizational structure within police departments. Haynes and 
Giblin (2014) expounded on contingency theory to explain how police agencies respond 
to homeland security risks within their environment. Haynes and Giblin (2014) found 
there was a positive relationship between risk and preparedness. The study also found 
that the threat significantly predicted the preparedness level of the police departments 
(Haynes & Giblin, 2014). 
The current study looked to confirm past research on the association between 
perceived risk and preparedness, while determining whether the contingency theory 
framework helped explain whether law enforcement agencies were prepared for a 
terrorist attack. The current thesis evaluated the definition of terrorism, role of the police 
in terrorism prevention, contingency planning, police policies and regulations, police 
training, police equipment, and the importance of public support and communication 
between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. 
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Study Objectives 
Surveying law enforcement agencies in the United States about their agencies’ 
perceptions of terrorism preparedness will provide law enforcement administrators data 
on what is needed to better prepare for a terrorist attack. A sample of 902 local and 
county law enforcement agencies was chosen from 5 states within the United States. 
Police administrators of the selected agencies were surveyed during the fall of 2015. The 
survey addressed the following questions: (a) Do municipal and county police agencies 
believe they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the 
next terrorist attack? (b) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk 
influence terrorism preparedness?  
Contributions to the Field  
This research provides vital information in understanding whether local and 
county police agencies are prepared for the next terrorist attack. This research allows law 
enforcement administrators to identify shortfalls within their counterterrorism 
preparedness measures. This research also identifies whether contingency theory helps 
predict law enforcement’s terrorism preparedness, as well as, any trends within the 
region.  
Thesis Overview 
In the next chapter (II), a literature review summarized existing research on police 
preparedness. Chapter III outlined contingency theory and how past studies have used the 
theory to explain police preparedness. Sample, sample size, variables, and analytic plans 
were discussed in chapter IV. In Chapter V, the results of the study were discussed. In the 
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final chapter, Chapter VI, discussion of the results, and limitations and implications of the 
study were presented. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Police emergency response preparedness is an essential element of the police 
mandate. It is necessary that police have a grasp of appropriate procedures in the event of 
an emergency. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, rather one that has become more 
frequent. Acts of terrorism can be traced back to the Greek and Roman republics. Some 
individuals believe the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C could be categorized as 
an act of terrorism (Combs, 2013). As acts of terrorism have become more common in 
the 21st century, the importance of police preparedness has increased. In 2000, according 
to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (2014), there were just under 
3,000 terrorist attacks around the world. As of 2013, there were 12,000 terrorist attacks 
across the word, resulting in a sharp increase (University of Maryland, 2014). This 
finding means the likelihood of a terrorist attack has grown over time. 
 As the probability of an attack rises, the need for state and local police to be 
prepared for a terrorist attack intensifies. Davis (2004) found that “few local law 
enforcement agencies had experience with responding to or investigating terrorist-related 
incidents” (p.13) prior to September 11, 2001. Federal law enforcement agencies were 
seen as the main element in terrorism prevention. Following the attacks of September 
11th, state and local law enforcement agencies took a more active role in 
counterterrorism. State and local law enforcement were tasked with fielding calls and 
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responding to reports of possible terrorist activity in their jurisdiction (Davis, 2004). 
Federal law enforcement agencies recognized that cooperation between state and local 
law enforcement agencies was a key element in terrorism prevention.  However, the 
question lingers about the preparedness of the police in the event of a future attack. The 
purpose of this thesis was to assess whether municipal and county police were prepared 
for the next terrorist attack. Each of these elements is essential for police preventing 
another terrorist attack within their jurisdiction.  
Definition of Terrorism  
The definition of terrorism is nebulous at best. According to Riley and Hoffman 
(1995) “there exists no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism” (p.2). There 
are some definitions that “focus on the terrorist organizations’ mode of operation” 
(Ganor, 2002, p. 290) and others that focus on motivations and characteristics. Schmid 
and Jongman (1988) conducted a survey of the field’s leading academics to see their 
definitions of terrorism. Their survey produced over “…109 different definitions of 
terrorism” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 5) and 20 different elements that affect the 
definition of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). If there is no precise definition of 
terrorism, then how can the police be prepared for such a threat? Not all law enforcement 
agencies operate under a universal definition of terrorism. One definition of terrorism is 
“violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm” 
(Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p.3). 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines terrorism as “The unlawful 
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social 
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objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d., n.p.). However, for legal purposes, 
the FBI uses the terrorism definition from the United States Code. The United States 
Code breaks the definition into 3 different sections: international terrorism, domestic 
terrorism, and the federal crime of terrorism. All of these sections have certain criteria 
and characteristics that have to be met to be considered to be terrorism. Riley and 
Hoffman (1995) surveyed 52 law enforcement agencies about terrorism preparedness. A 
key finding of their study was that surveyed law enforcement agencies did not follow the 
official FBI definition (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).  Agencies were not aware of the FBI’s 
guidelines or how the FBI came to their rationale for defining actions of terrorism (Riley 
& Hoffman, 1995).  
The lack of a universal definition of terrorism can be problematic in police 
terrorism preparedness. For example, when a law enforcement agency perceives what 
they believe to be an act of terrorism, the information is then forwarded to the FBI. 
However, upon further investigation by the FBI, the case is usually “reclassified as 
ordinary crime” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 4). For the purpose of this study, the FBI’s 
definition of terrorism will be used because it comes from the United States Code.     
The Role of Police  
Local, state and federal law enforcement agencies’ roles were altered to 
concentrate on counterterrorism due to the events of September 11th. Before the attacks of 
September 11th, the roles of the police were to protect the public along with fulfilling 
their mandate of policing the dangerous class (Rabe-Hemp, 2014). In addition to these 
previous roles, law enforcement agencies are now responsible for preventing terrorist 
attacks in their communities, states, and nation. When President George W. Bush referred 
 10 
to combating terrorism, he called it the “War on Terrorism.” Many believed that the “War 
on Terrorism” was solely going to be a military campaign (Brooks, 2010). Within the last 
10 years, law enforcement agencies have increasingly possessed a military appearance 
while conducting their policing roles alongside their terrorism prevention roles. Many 
agencies have been recipients of military equipment in the name terrorism prevention and 
the “War on Terrorism.” Hill and Beger (2009) attributed the militarization of law 
enforcement agencies to the “tendency of the state to treat all CTAs [clandestine 
transnational actors] as a threat to national security” (p. 28), therefore altering agencies’ 
roles in terrorism prevention. Today, many law enforcement agencies’ roles are 
encompassed under the counterterrorism umbrella.  
However, military forces are not always the best choice for preventing a terrorist 
attack. Terrorists are becoming more involved in criminal-type activity. This is partially 
due to the terrorist organization’s assets being frozen in other countries (Brooks, 2010). 
When their financial funds are no longer available, they look to other means to locate 
funding for their mission. For example, terrorists regularly utilize black market trade in 
the areas of drug smuggling, human trafficking, and arms trade among other ways to raise 
funds. Terrorists have also been involved in money laundering and ATM fraud to gather 
the necessary financial backing is needed for their terrorist plots (Brooks, 2010).  
The increase in criminal activity by terrorists results in “…an increase in police 
actions” (Brooks, 2010, p. 115). Law enforcement agencies not only have homeland 
security roles now, but they still have their original responsibilities and roles to perform. 
For example, police are still responsible for, “…fighting new synthetic drug epidemics 
(methamphetamines), managing and helping to enforce sex offenders registries, fighting 
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identity theft and computer crimes, and assisting federal officials with immigration 
enforcement and investigations” (Council of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky 
University, 2006, p. 10). Always having contact and interactions with the community, 
local police departments are more likely than federal agencies to gather a greater amount 
of intelligence on terrorist activities within their communities. Henry (2002) envisioned a 
system that allowed law enforcement agencies to become more attuned to intelligence 
gathering. Henry (2002) noted: 
Two key elements in successfully exploiting the vast repository of 
intelligence information resides in American police agencies, then, are 
shifting the police mindset to include the notion of fighting terrorism and 
educating police officers about terrorist practices, methods and activities 
(p. 325). 
Law enforcement agencies are essentially being used to gather intelligence on terrorist 
activities. Using local and state law enforcement agencies to gather intelligence on 
suspected terrorist or terrorist activity allows the agencies to be out in the community 
creating relationships. When the police are able to make relationships with the 
community they serve, it opens the possibility that more valuable intelligence can be 
gathered. It is important, besides gathering intelligence, that police officers receive 
adequate educational training to fulfill their new role in the 21st century. Training on what 
to expect and respond to when a terrorist attack happens allows law enforcement agencies 
to have an understanding of how to fulfill their new role of terrorism prevention in their 
communities. Also, local law enforcement agencies are “expected to develop and 
implement their own response plans” (Pelfrey, 2007, p. 314) in the event of a terrorist 
attack in their communities.  
To create a terrorism contingency plan, law enforcement agencies must determine 
the different types of possible terrorist attacks that could happen within their 
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communities. Law enforcement agencies plan for terrorist attacks such as mass causality, 
nuclear, chemical and biological, cyber, and power grid attacks within their communities. 
Although law enforcement agencies now have the role of terrorism prevention, they still 
need to coordinate with other agencies to fulfill their role. Agencies such as emergency 
services (fire departments and EMT services), public works, and local offices of Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are essential for creating a comprehensive and 
collaborative terrorism contingency plan. 
Planning  
Planning is a key element for preventing another terrorist attack in the United 
States. Many police departments have contingency plans in place as a result of the events 
of September 11th. Contingency plans can serve as an adequate way to determine a 
department’s preparedness against a terrorist attack. The purpose of a contingency plan is 
“to identify available resources and identify ways those resources can be formed into an 
operational plan” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 26). One element of a contingency plan is 
“determining which organizations will bear responsibility for various aspects of 
addressing a terrorist attack” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 26). Another important element 
of contingency planning is having coordination and a liaison with other law enforcement 
agencies that have other terrorism prevention responsibilities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). 
Riley and Hoffman (1995) conducted a study of state and local law enforcement agencies 
about their level of terrorism preparedness. They found that 38 percent of state law 
enforcement agencies had some type of contingency plan in place to deal with the threat 
of terrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). In contrast, they found that 52 percent of local law 
enforcement agencies and nearly 56 percent of state emergency management 
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organizations had some type of contingency plan in place in the event of a terrorist attack 
(Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Agencies based in an area with a large population were more 
likely to have a contingency plan (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). This is understandable as a 
terrorist attack is more likely to happen in an urban area where the number of possible 
causalities is the greatest. So it is essential that urban law enforcement agencies have a 
plan in place in case of an attack.  
Agencies are also more likely to develop a contingency plan if the agencies’ 
jurisdiction houses a sensitive facility or a high-risk target (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). A 
sensitive facility is any building that could cause more damage to the surrounding areas. 
These sensitive facilities are usually buildings such as nuclear power plants, weapon 
facilities, military installations, and energy facilities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Riley and 
Hoffman (1995) surprisingly found that if there was a nuclear power plant located in an 
agency’s jurisdiction, then the agency was likely to have a contingency plan only 50 
percent of the time. It is also not uncommon for law enforcement agencies that have a 
contingency plan in place to have other agencies review the plan. Some agencies have 
more than one agency review the plan to help identify possible problems within the plan. 
The most common agency that reviews other law enforcement agencies’ 
contingency plans is the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The FBI reviews more 
than 70 percent of state law enforcement agencies’ plans (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). 
However, the FBI only reviews 47 percent of municipalities’ and counties’ plans (Riley 
& Hoffman, 1995). This emphasizes a potential weakness in developing a solid 
contingency plan against the threat of terrorism. The lack of review from the FBI, the 
leading entity of the preventing terrorism in the United States, on municipalities’ and 
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counties’ contingency plans does not set a good tone when it comes to cooperation. State 
police have jurisdiction throughout their entire state, but many state law enforcement 
agencies are spaced few and far between and have more area to patrol. Once the 
contingency plan is in place, then the law enforcement agencies can focus more on their 
training. However, for training to occur, there is a need for counterterrorism policies to be 
in place. 
Policy  
Counterterrorism policy for local, state and federal law enforcement agencies are 
intertwined. The United States has been developing its counterterrorism policy for over 
30 years (Combating Terrorism, 2001). Over the past 30 years, the United States’ strategy 
for combating terrorism has been the idea of using crisis and consequence management 
(Combating Terrorism, 2001). Crisis management is preventing and deterring a terrorist 
attack, to protect public health and safety, to arrest terrorists, and to gather evidence for 
criminal prosecution. Consequence management on the other hand is slightly different. 
Consequence management provides medical treatment and emergency services to anyone 
in the affected area. They also evacuate anyone in the dangerous areas as well as 
attempting to restore any government services that were disrupted by a terrorist attack 
(Combating Terrorism, 2001). This strategy is available to local and state law 
enforcement agencies if the agencies are in need of assistance. Local and state law 
enforcement agencies have primary responsibility for managing the result of a domestic 
terrorist attack. These agencies also serve a role in ordering restorative efforts after an 
attack occurs (Randol, 2013; Shernock, 2009).   
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Pelfrey (2010) conducted a study of law enforcement agencies’ terrorism 
prevention efforts. He looked at law enforcement agencies in North Carolina. Surveys 
were given to law enforcement agencies with questions about formal policies being 
drafted about the standard operating procedure when responding to a terrorist threat. 
Pelfrey (2010) found that 25 percent of the responding law enforcement agencies had 
developed a formal policy on defining the standard operating procedure in an event of a 
terrorist attack. It is important for law enforcement agencies to have effective training 
procedures that allow officers to operate within the terrorism policy the agency has in 
place.  
Training  
Training has become an essential part of law enforcement’s role in preventing 
terrorism. Many law enforcement agencies have incorporated training focused on the 
prevention of terrorism. Law enforcement agencies have conducted scenario training to 
give officers a real-life experience similar to what they could expect in a terrorist attack. 
These hypothetical scenarios help law enforcement agencies pinpoint weaknesses and 
possible overlaps in their response plans (Pelfrey, 2010). Pelfrey (2010) asked law 
enforcement agencies about their training and whether they have conducted scenario 
training before. He found that 37 percent of the agencies had participated in that type of 
training (Pelfrey, 2010). He noted that law enforcement agencies were not the only 
agencies that conducted this type of training. Fire departments and emergency medical 
services (EMS), also took part in this type training. The New York Police Department 
(NYPD) developed a training program for their officers that consisted of one day of 
tactical role-playing scenarios (Henry, 2002). Following the tactical role-playing, there 
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was one day of classroom instruction for the officers (Henry, 2002). In the classroom 
portion, the officers were informed about the history and various activities of terrorist 
groups. They were also provided with the tactical and cognitive knowledge they would 
need to recognize and prevent terrorist plots, like bombings and any type of weapons of 
mass destruction (Henry, 2002). The NYPD program is just one program that has been 
implemented since September 11th to help prevent terrorism. 
Before practical training can begin, there must be an educational foundation. 
There are organizations that offer education classes on homeland security, which are 
available to law enforcement agencies across the nation. Security Solutions International 
(SSI) offers a wide range of homeland security courses and seminars strictly for law 
enforcement agencies. The mission statement of SSI is to further “the highest degree of 
emergency preparedness for ground, air and sea” (Schreiber, 2008, p. 51). Besides 
providing educational background on terrorism, the organization also places great 
emphasis on case studies and hands-on training (Schreiber, 2008). Examining case 
studies encourages law enforcement officers to figure out and recognize the mistakes that 
were made and how they can prevent those mistakes in the future. 
Some of the practical hands-on training included conducting searches and assaults 
on other possible transportation that could be used in a terrorist attack. Many units have 
looked to practice on assaulting aircrafts and trains. By conducting their training on these 
types of transportation vehicles, law enforcement officers have a better understanding 
how to handle a terrorist situation. For the law enforcement agency to use aircrafts and 
trains for training purposes, they are usually in contact with other organizations that have 
access to decommissioned vehicles that the agencies can use for the purpose of training. 
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The different types of training offered to law enforcement agencies all require some type 
of funding.   
After September 11th there was a large amount of federal funding available for 
law enforcement agencies to use toward terrorism prevention training. Recently, federal 
funding has been harder to obtain. An officer in Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office in 
Tampa, Florida mentioned that the funding is “still there, but it’s much more difficult to 
secure” (Schreiber, 2008, p. 53). Without federal funding for training, law enforcement 
agencies would have a harder time conducting the necessary training for terrorism 
prevention. 
Equipment 
In recent years, law enforcement agencies have come into contact with many 
different types of tactical equipment. Much of the new tactical equipment has come from 
the federal government through government programs that allow transfers of unused 
Department of Defense property. One of the most notable Department of Defense 
programs is the 1033 Program. The 1033 Program is also known as the Excessive 
Property Program. The program was named after a section in the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997 (Else, 2014). The section in which the 1033 program 
was named after states:  
Granted permanent authority to the secretary of Defense to transfer 
defense material to federal and state agencies for use in law enforcement, 
particularly those associated with counter-drug and counter-terrorism 
activities (Else, 2014, n.p.). 
The program allowed local and state law enforcement agencies to apply to the 1033 
program to receive military equipment at no cost to the receiving agency. The only cost 
the receiving agency would incur was transportation fees (Elise, 2014). This means the 
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agency receiving the equipment would only have to fund the cost of having the items 
transported to their location. Before the NDAA of 1997 was passed, it was preceded by 
legislation in 1988 that allowed the Department of Defense’s role to expand in banning 
illegal drug trafficking. Following the terrorist attacks around the world and the domestic 
terrorist attack in the United States in 1995 of the Oklahoma City bombing; it was 
deemed the 1988 legislation was not adequate for the current times. When the NDAA of 
1997 was passed, a counterterrorism element was added, as well as making the act 
permanent (Elise, 2014).  
The different types of equipment that law enforcement agencies are able to 
receive through the 1033 program varies. Law enforcement agencies can request anything 
from office furniture to tactical vehicles. To receive the equipment the law enforcement 
agency only needs to complete a form stating why the specific equipment was necessary 
for terrorism prevention or drug prevention.  
Other programs allow law enforcement units to purchase the equipment needed 
for preventing a terrorist attack. The State Domestic Preparedness Program was designed 
to help “prepare law enforcement agencies to respond to incidents of terrorism” (Vardalis 
& Waters, 2010, p. 4). Grant funding can help the agency with their counterterrorism 
responsibilities (Newman & Clarke, 2008). According to the Center for Investigative 
Reporting (CIR) at the end of 2011 “Homeland Security had given out at least $34 billion 
in anti-terror grants since September 11, 2001” (Becker & Schulz, 2011). The CIR also 
reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “awarded more than $2 billion 
in grants” (Becker & Schulz, 2011) in 2011 for terrorism prevention. However, “the 
federal government doesn’t keep close track” (Becker & Schulz, 2011) of how the 
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agencies use the grant money. Law enforcement agencies seem to most commonly 
purchase “gas masks and chemical protective clothing” (Vardalis & Water, 2010, p. 5) 
for their terrorism prevention measures. However, law enforcement agencies have 
purchased surveillance drones and heavy armored vehicles for their departments with the 
money from anti-terror grants from the DHS (Balko, 2013). 
Counterterrorism Units 
The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) program in the FBI has been around for 
35 years. The first JTTF was created in 1980 in New York City and had 11 NYPD 
officers and 11 FBI special agents (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). It 
was not until recently the JTTF was expanded to include communication with local and 
state agencies with federal law enforcement (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). Before the 
communication expansion, sharing information with commanders was problematic 
because of security clearance issues (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). 
Before September 11th, there were only 35 JTTF’s in the United States (Ortiz, Hendricks 
& Sugie, 2007). Following September 11th, the number of JTTF’s increased to over 70 
operating in the United States (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). This increase of 
participation in the JTTF’s could have been a result of the lack of communication before 
September 11th.  A study by Ortiz, Hendricks and Sugie (2007) found that of the surveyed 
law enforcement agencies, 88 percent of the agencies participated in the FBI’s JTTF 
program.  
Terrorism can affect anyone on a catastrophic scale at any time. The average law 
enforcement officer does not receive all of the training that specialized units do. Many 
specialized units receive training from other law enforcement agencies as well as the 
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military. Counterterrorism units are among the most highly trained to handle terrorist 
situations. These units solely deal with terrorist activities and gathering intelligence for 
other law enforcement agencies. However, many law enforcement agencies are unable to 
participate in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), due to the lack of resources and 
funding.  
Although Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie (2007) found there were a large number of 
agencies that participated in the JTTF program within their sample, it is understandable 
why some agencies, specifically smaller agencies, would not be able to participate in a 
counterterrorism unit. Participating in the program requires the law enforcement agency 
to have one or more officers solely devoted to the JTTF. This is difficult for some 
agencies because of the small number of sworn officers they have in their department. It 
also could be that the agency lacks the resources needed to participate in the program. 
There are also some criticisms on how the JTTF operates. In Protecting Your Community 
from Terrorism (2003), it is mentioned that JTTF’s “involve too few law enforcement 
officers and do not draw on the full capabilities that local law enforcement can bring to 
the table” (p. 32). It was believed that the JTTF should work closer with local law 
enforcement to locate officers who could work in the JTTF for investigation purposes on 
an as need basis (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). 
Public Support 
Public support has become a key part in terrorism prevention. If the public does 
not have confidence in law enforcement agencies to prevent a terrorist attack, it could 
undermine law enforcement’s prevention efforts. Apart from the main goal of terrorists, 
causing destruction of key targets, they are also looking to undermine the public’s morale 
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and confidence (Baldwin, Ramaprasad, & Samsa, 2008). Public support and confidence 
is important to the way law enforcement agencies operate. Terrorism prevention requires 
a “balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the U.S. population so that 
local residents will partner with the police in the pursuit of their lawful mission” 
(Downing, 2009, n.p.). If law enforcement agencies are able get the communities’ 
support and have them understand that the agency is operating within the communities’ 
best interest, there is a better chance the agency can gather more intelligence. This is 
important, especially if the community has become a breeding ground for suspected 
terrorists. Once the police are able to gain the communities’ support in their terrorism 
prevention efforts, it would be more likely that residents of the community would report 
suspicious activity in their neighborhoods. 
Communication and Cooperation 
Besides having a contingency plan, communication and cooperation with other 
law enforcement agencies is important for preventing terrorism in the United States. In 
1995, when there was a terrorist attack in Tokyo and the bombing in Oklahoma City, the 
United States started to recognize there was a need to combat terrorism and that 
communication and cooperation between agencies was necessary. These terrorist attacks 
allowed the federal government to realize there was an escalating concern and a lack of 
terrorism prevention. In June of 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 was issued. 
This directive gave the responsibilities to federal law enforcement agencies to combat 
terrorism, including domestic terrorism (Combating Terrorism, 2002). It was quickly 
recognized that communication and cooperation between federal and state law 
enforcement was needed. Not only was communication and cooperation needed but it 
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was also realized that federal law enforcement agencies were not capable of effectively 
preventing terrorism across the United States. In order to address this gap, Congress 
passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Combating 
Terrorism, 2002). This act allowed local and state law enforcement agencies and 
emergency services to be equipped and trained in case there was a terrorist attack. They 
were trained and equipped because it was highly likely that they would be the first 
responders in the event of a domestic terrorist attack (Combating Terrorism, 2002). In 
2001, the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 was passed, which 
allowed the federal government to “enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency 
preparedness and response” (Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 4).  
  Ever since the events of September 11th, police communication and cooperation 
with other agencies has come under scrutiny. For example, there were “turf battles and 
the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement 
community,” (Downing, 2009, p. 3) which led to a failure in key intelligence gathering. 
Now, local, state, and even tribal police are working with federal law enforcement 
agencies in preventing terrorism (Wager, 2012). They are now considered “integral 
players in terrorism prevention” (Wager, 2012, p. 20). It is essential that “all levels of 
government and the private sector communicate and cooperate effectively with one 
another” (Combating Terrorism, 2002, p.6). 
As a result of inter-agency cooperation, information sharing with one another 
increases. It is important that all levels of law enforcement agencies communicate with 
each other on the intelligence they gather on suspected terrorist activities. After the 
intelligence is gathered it is essential that the information be verified and determined if it 
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is usable for other law enforcement agencies. The information holds little value until it is 
subject to an analysis and evaluated (Henry, 2002). If the intelligence is considered of 
value then the information is passed onto other law enforcement agencies so the officers 
can make use of the information. Only then, when information is disseminated to the 
officers, “can their talents at intelligence gathering be fully utilized” (Henry, 2002, p. 
326). Another type of communication among law enforcement agencies across the nation 
is terrorism awareness bulletins. These bulletins are usually read in roll call for officers 
preparing to start their patrols. The bulletins provide law enforcement officers with 
information to help them recognize possible terrorist activities, as well as current threats 
(Henry, 2002). The bulletins also provide information about certain descriptions of odors 
that would indicate a possible airborne chemical agent in an area (Henry, 2002).  
Terrorism awareness bulletins are not the only approach law enforcement 
agencies use to pass along information. There are other approaches that are used to help 
information sharing among jurisdictional lines in different states. One program is called 
Hampton Roads CRIMES. This program allows law enforcement officers from seven 
different jurisdictions to access criminal justice information systems from participating 
agencies to view existing records of individuals suspected of criminal activity (Protecting 
Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Another information sharing system is the 
Chicago Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) program. 
Chicago CLEAR provides information to the users in real time (Protecting Your 
Community from Terrorism, 2003). Officers can see analyses of beat-level crime 
problems and “online information on offenders, victims, arrests, evidence/property and 
similar cases” (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003, p. 62). There are more 
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than 120 agencies in the state of Illinois that contribute information to the CLEAR 
program (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Fusion Centers also allow 
agencies to exchange information and intelligence with other law enforcement agencies 
in the United States (Lambert, 2010). The growth of fusion centers in the United States 
shows that “no one police or public safety organization has all of the information it needs 
to effectively address crime problems” (Lambert, 2010, p. 2). Counter-terrorism Training 
and Resources for Law Enforcement Web site is another tool that allows agencies to 
share information (Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group, 2003). 
These programs are allowing law enforcement to share information within their states.  
There is a federal law enforcement program currently open to all state and local 
law enforcement agencies. The program is called Law Enforcement On-line (LEO). LEO 
is a “virtual privacy network that contains significant sensitive but unclassified 
information” (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003, p. 63). The program is 
free to all law enforcement agencies. The FBI administers the information provided on 
LEO. In 2003, at the time Protecting Your Community from Terrorism was published, the 
FBI was conducting a pilot test on a new information-sharing program. The program was 
called the JTTF Information Sharing Initiative. The program being tested in St. Louis, 
San Diego, Spokane, Norfolk, and Baltimore (Protecting Your Community from 
Terrorism, 2003). The JTTF Information-Sharing Initiative is a program where, for the 
first time, the FBI is adding investigative case files (up to a Secret classification) to an 
information sharing system where local and state law enforcement agencies have access 
to them (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Communication, 
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intelligence sharing, and cooperation between local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies are essential to preventing terrorism within the community and the nation. 
Conclusion  
Law enforcement’s role is ever changing and it now encompasses terrorism 
prevention. Many law enforcement agencies are in need of terrorism prevention policies. 
Once policies are in place, law enforcement agencies can become more effective in 
preventing terrorism in their communities and states. Classroom and scenario training 
have proven effective in correcting past mistakes. Equipment for law enforcement 
agencies’ terrorism prevention measures is necessary. State and local law enforcement 
agencies need to be equipped with the necessary tools to keep their communities safe 
from acts of terrorism. It is also important that law enforcement interacts with and creates 
relationships with their communities. By doing so, it allows for intelligence and 
information to be gathered through members of the community, who are more likely to 
witness suspicious activity. As long as the public trusts the police, intelligence and 
information will continue to flow. When a police department can adapt to their ever-
changing environment, the police can better serve the public they swore to protect.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Contingency theory has been around since the 1950s. This theory posits that an 
organization must adapt to its environment in order to survive and be effective. The heart 
of contingency theory is that a state of fit, described as equilibrium between structure and 
contingency, leads to a high performing organization (Woodward, 1965). This framework 
was applied to the perception of preparedness of police agencies to handle the next 
terrorist attack. Since the dreadful day of September 11th, law enforcement agencies have 
taken a vital role in counterterrorism efforts. This chapter will discuss contingency 
theory, how it has been applied to criminal justice research, including past studies, and 
how it was applied to the current study. 
Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory posits that an organization rationally adapts to their 
environment to accomplish a fit between structure and contingencies. In this model, 
organizations that are fit enjoy higher performance, which generates resources and 
growth including size, innovation, and diversification. Organizational structure such as 
formalization and decentralization are related to contingencies such as size and 
diversification. The variations in organizational structure and agency contingencies, 
defined as fit, impact organizational performance. Lex Donaldson (2001), author of The 
Contingency Theory of Organizations, contended that organizations strive to be fit 
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because when an organization is fit, it enjoys high performance, defined as the structural 
adaptation to regain fit model (SARFIT). Therefore, organizations need to find a state of 
fit between structure and contingency. When organizations are unable to find a state of fit 
(i.e., due to the inability to adapt structurally) it is seen as a state of misfit (Donaldson, 
2001). Organizations often only stay in a state of misfit temporarily until an increase in 
contingency variables, such as new hires or innovations, lead the organization back into a 
state of fit with its structure. In this model, organizations are seen as seeking a state of 
equilibrium adjusting their structures to the needs of the ever-changing environment. In 
other words, organizations have to be able to adapt to “new organizational characteristics 
that fit the new levels of the contingencies” (Donaldson, 2001, p.2).  
Core Elements 
Contingency theory consists of three core elements. The first core element is the 
association between the contingencies (i.e., size and diversification) and the structure 
(i.e., formalization and decentralization) of the organization. Essentially, when the 
contingency variables increase, the organizational structure variables should increase as 
well (Donaldson, 2001). For example, an agency in fit performs better which leads to 
increased legitimacy and growth, but eventually this increase in growth would require a 
change in the existing structure. In this way the structure has to directly relate to the 
organization in which it is being applied, leading to the second core element, which is 
that the contingency determines the structure of the organization. When a contingency 
changes, it causes the organization to change its structure. Changing the structure to adapt 
with the change in the contingency allows the organization to operate at a higher 
performance level (Donaldson, 2001). For example, typically the United States Coast 
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Guard operates under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security. However, 
it is a contingency that in wartime, the Coast Guard may be reassigned to the Department 
of the Navy, which falls under the Department of Defense. This is in place to increase the 
effectiveness of military strategy.  
The final element of the core paradigm deals with whether there is a proper fit 
between the contingency and organizational structure. When an organization’s structure 
has a good fit with the contingency, it leads to higher performance. If the organization 
has a misfit, it will lead to a poorer performance (Donaldson, 2001). An example of this 
would be a contingency that was in place in an agency prior to a restructure. The 
contingency may call for one department to complete a certain task but the department 
may not exist anymore due to the restructuring of the agency. This may lead to confusion, 
poor performance, and possibly failure of the agency. A well thought out contingency 
will allow an agency to continue to operate, regardless of obstacles they may face, which 
will lead to better performance compared to their less prepared counterpart. 
Fundamentally, contingency theory speculates that an organization will strive to remain 
fit to increase performance when there is a change in the agency’s internal contingencies 
and organizational structure. 
Application to Policing 
Contingency theory has been applied to a few policing studies in the past. Jihong 
Zhao, Ling Ren, and Nicholas Lovrich (2010) applied contingency theory to 
organizational structures of police agencies during the 1990s to determine if contingency 
theory explained the adoption of community policing innovations. They measured 
contingency theory through two hypothesized variables: environmental complexity and 
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organizational size. The authors collected their data from six principal sources. Their first 
source of data was from the Division of Governmental Studies and Services (DGSS) at 
Washington State University. The DGSS surveyed municipal police departments in 1993, 
1996, and in 2000. Following the data from the DGSS, subsequent sources of data were 
collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics covering municipal unemployment data 
from 1993 to 2000, Census Reports from 1990 to 2000, and annual finance surveys of 
city government, which was conducted by the Census as well. The last two sources of 
data in their study came from emails or phone calls of the cities that were in their sample 
already, and the amount of money that was awarded to law enforcement agencies through 
Making Officers Redeployment Effective grants (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). 
The authors’ primary finding was that there had been a very limited change in the 
organizational structure of the agencies (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). They did see a 
few independent variables associated with the adoption of structural change during the 
1990s, such as a 15 percent increase in the number of daytime patrol beats. This increase 
was seen in 195 agencies that were surveyed continually over the course of the 1990s. 
The study found that the Making Officers Redeployment Effective grant funds and the 
indicator for implementation of innovative programs did not show a consistent effect on 
structural change in police departments. The researchers found that “contingency relating 
to environmental complexity has a key place in research on police organizations” (Zhao, 
Ren, & Lovrich, 2010, p.223).  
Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich’s (2010) research built upon early police organization 
research that explored the ability of organizational size and environmental complexity to 
predict structural arrangements in police agencies. For example, Langworthy (1985) 
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explored the impact of organizational size and population diversity on structural 
arrangements within 176 police departments. Organizational size was an important 
predictor of the number of patrol beats, the number of ranks, proportion of civilians and, 
proportion of supervisors. Other early studies, including Crank and Wells (1991) and 
Maguire (2003) confirmed that organizational size was a significant predictor of 
organizational structure in police departments.  
Melissa Haynes and Matthew Giblin (2014) expanded the contingency theory 
perspective by applying it to how police organizations responded to risks in their 
environment to prepare for homeland security incidents. Their research built upon 
previous studies that confirmed that police agencies faced with higher levels of risk, a 
key external contingency (i.e., risk or crime), are more likely to take steps to be prepared 
(Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Burruss, & 
Schafer, 2014).  
While contingency theory has not received much empirical support when applied 
to community policing innovations, it has received significant support in explaining 
homeland security preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006, Schafer, Burruss, 
& Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). This support has been demonstrated 
in national surveys, which have addressed terrorism preparedness among local police 
departments across the United States (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006) as well as 
small and large municipal police agencies across Illinois (Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 
2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010) and in a national sample of small municipal 
police departments (Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014).  
 31 
Haynes and Giblin (2014) explored the relationship between subjective and 
objective risk factors and organizational preparedness utilizing a contingency framework. 
They collected data from a 2011 national survey of 350 small (i.e., consisted of fewer 
than 25 sworn officers) law enforcement agencies. The findings of this study suggest a 
negative relationship between risk and preparedness. The contingency theory framework 
was supported as an explanation for the different levels of homeland security 
preparedness in police agencies. Threat was the only factor that significantly predicted 
preparedness level within police departments. The study also found that the objective 
factors of vulnerability and consequences were not associated with preparedness levels 
within police agencies. Objective risks were also found to not be associated with 
subjective perceptions. In other words, the preparedness level of the department was not 
influenced by the actual risks within the police department’s jurisdiction (Haynes, & 
Giblin, 2014). Burruss, Giblin, and Schafer, (2010) found that institutional pressures (i.e., 
organizations conforming to what is supported in the larger environment) were more 
prominent than perceived risk measures. That being said, Haynes and Giblin (2014) 
believed that objective risk factors could prove irrelevant because all police agencies face 
some type of pressure to address and incorporate homeland security functions into their 
department. Past criminal justice research has proven that risk is related to how prepared 
an agency is. Research has also found that organizational size is an important predictor of 
organizational structure.  
Application to Current Study 
The driving force behind structural arrangements is the external environment 
within which organizations operate. The events of September 11th have prompted police 
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agencies to adapt to this new threat by being the front line in anti-terrorist efforts. Their 
role is predicated upon their close ties to their community members and the ability to 
identify suspicious activities, which may preempt an attack. The pressure for agencies to 
adopt this front line role, which comes from the public, as well as federal law 
enforcement agencies increasingly rely on local law enforcement to identify, report, and 
respond to potential terrorist threats. Agencies have adapted in several different structural 
ways, including: the creation and implementation of specialized units designed to gather 
intelligence and assess risk, training for line officers in how to identify and respond to 
attacks, and participation in joint-terrorist task forces and fusion centers. The federal 
government recognized the vital role of the police in homeland security preparedness and 
provided the departments with support through the form of external grants. Individual 
states also provided grants to police departments for homeland security preparedness 
purposes. Agencies could obtain state and federal grants for homeland security 
preparedness, but they would also use their own internal resources to increase their 
preparedness.     
Evidence from contingency theory suggests these structural responses to 
terrorism, such as units and specialized training, or participation in joint terrorism task 
forces could be attempts to move into a state of fit, which in turn will increase 
performance. Many aspects of organizational structure, including environmental 
complexity are related to contingencies such as organizational size. Contingency theory 
research reveals considerable variations across organization in structure, even for 
organizations in the same industry (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971). In other words, we would 
have expected considerable variability among agencies and how they structure their 
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response to terrorist threats. However, a lack of fit between an agency or organizational 
structure and their contingencies (i.e., organizational size) may have implications for the 
perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the agencies’ plans for responding to terrorism. 
The goal of this research was to assess the state of fit within the law enforcement 
agencies surveyed and to identify trends within the region. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 Law enforcement terrorism preparedness has become more important now than 
ever. Past research has shown that terrorism preparedness is essential to police 
operations. For example, in a study conducted by Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie (2007), 88 
percent of the agencies surveyed actively participated in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 
Force. With the passing of the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, 
local agencies became more involved in terrorism preparedness with the help of the 
federal government (Combating Terrorism, 2002). Sharing information with other 
agencies has become important, not only in regular law enforcement duties, but as well in 
terrorism preparedness. Based on contingency theory, the present study draws upon past 
research on police structure and terrorism preparedness, to determine if there is an 
association between an agency’s terrorism preparedness in order to remain in a state of 
fit. A survey was distributed to county and municipal law enforcement agencies across 5 
states, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The sample for this study was 
902 agencies consisting of 435 county sheriff agencies and 467 municipalities.  
The following research questions were addressed in this study:  
1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the necessary 
resources and training to prevent and/or respond to the next terrorist attack?   
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2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism 
preparedness?  
 Data for the current study came from a survey sent to county and municipal law 
enforcement administrators asking about their agency’s terrorism preparedness. Previous 
research provides empirical support for the relationship between risk and law 
enforcement homeland security activities (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss, 
Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). The current study looked to 
confirm and extend past research by exploring how police agencies prepare for terrorist 
incidents using the contingency theory framework. The current study looked at law 
enforcement terrorism preparedness on a broader scale than previous research.   
Setting 
The states chosen for this study were Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin. These states were selected based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s map regions. 
The 5 states listed above fall into the East North Central region of the U.S. Census 
Bureau (U.S. Census, 2015). Due to the recent publicity of the police shooting of Michael 
Brown in the state of Missouri, at the time of this study, the state was excluded from 
being used in the sample for fear that it could skew the data. Illinois was of particular 
interest as it was the location of the where the study was being conducted from. In order 
to exclude the state of Missouri from the sample pool, the East North Central Region of 
the U.S. Census Bureau was chosen. This allowed Illinois to be included in the sample 
pool while precluding Missouri.  
 The state of Illinois is home to a population of 12,880,580 with approximately 
231.1 persons per a square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Indiana has a population of 
 36 
6,596,855 with approximately 181.0 persons per square mile. The state of Michigan is 
home to 9,909,877 people with roughly 174.8 persons per a square mile. As of the 2014 
U.S. Census, the state of Ohio has a population of 11,594,163 with nearly 282.3 persons 
per a square mile. Finally the state of Wisconsin is home to 5,757,564 with around 105.0 
persons per a square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Currently, there are nearly 2,800 
municipal police departments operating within Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin combined (National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators, 2014). 
Selection Criteria 
 All of the agencies in the study were chosen from the 2015 National Directory of 
Law Enforcement Administrators. All municipal law enforcement agencies from all 5 
states were entered into the sample pool. All county sheriff agencies from all 5 states 
were included in the sample pool. However, all municipal agencies were not chosen for 
inclusion due to the sheer number of agencies. Time constraints also played a role in 
deciding to randomly select 93 municipality agencies from each state to make up a 
sample size of 902 agencies. State law enforcement agencies were not included in the 
current study because it was assumed that much of the counterterrorism funding would be 
earmarked for the state police. Therefore, they would have the necessary tools to have an 
adequate terrorism preparedness plan in place. Also, their inclusion could have skew any 
findings of the study.  
Sample 
 There were a total of 2,791 municipal law enforcement agencies in the sample 
pool from the 5 predetermined states. The sample size of 902 was desired and therefore 
the sample pool was narrowed down using random sampling. The sample size was 
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narrowed down to 902 agencies from 2,791 due to the sheer size of the original sample. A 
sample of 902 agencies would give a better overall picture of the issue being studied. 
Therefore, by choosing a large sample size, there would be a large enough return rate to 
improve generalizability of the findings.  There were 437 county sheriff agencies and 465 
municipal law enforcement agencies selected. The number of county sheriff agencies 
(n=437) reflected the total number of counties in the 5 states. All county sheriff agencies 
were sampled. For municipal agencies, each state produced 93 municipal law 
enforcement agencies through random sampling of each state’s municipal sample pool. 
After subtracting all of the county agencies (n=437) there were 465 municipal agencies 
left. In order to ensure that each state had an even number of municipality agencies 
chosen for the sample, the number had to be divisible by 5. Therefore, by dividing 465 
agencies across 5 states, that provided a sample of 93 municipal agencies per a state. The 
original sampling pool for municipal and county agencies contained duplicates. These 
duplicates were removed from the sample before random sampling was conducted. 
Following distribution of the survey, a response rate of 12.74 percent was achieved with 
115 useable cases.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable  
 In this study, the dependent variable was preparedness. The variable preparedness 
was defined as any step taken to prevent or respond to a terrorist act. Schafer, Burruss, 
and Giblin (2009) measured preparedness by providing descriptions of steps or activities 
that enhanced preparedness and asked the respondents to mark the steps or activities that 
were being implemented at their agency and their level of preparedness. Burruss, Giblin, 
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and Schafer (2010) measured preparedness by asking the agencies to indicate the 
common actions their agencies had taken after September 11, 2001. For the purpose of 
this study, preparedness was measured through a series of questions regarding actions 
taken to increase terrorism preparedness. The surveyed agencies were asked a range of 
questions from whether their agency had implemented any specialized units, scheduled 
counterterrorism training, and the agency’s perceived level of preparedness on different 
resources. The dependent variable was coded by creating two summed indexes of 
preparedness, resources (Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009) and training (Burruss, Giblin, 
& Schafer, 2010), of the responses received from the agencies. The resources index 
included questions about the agency’s level of preparedness on the following: partnership 
with other local responders, ability to communicate with other agencies, written 
emergency response plan, training to respond to emergencies, level of preparedness for 
large-scale incidents, knowledge and expertise about emergency response, equipment to 
respond to emergencies, and budget to support emergency operations. The training index 
asked participants if they implemented the following since September 11th: created 
specialized units, created an internal task force, assigned individuals to address 
emergency preparedness, increased number of staff dedicated to emergency 
preparedness, scheduled training for terrorism related incidents, trained personnel on 
emergency response, identified training opportunities, participated in field training 
exercises, and participated in table-top exercises.   
Independent Variable(s)  
 The first measure, for state of fit, was organizational structure, which was defined 
as a hierarchical system that creates lines of authority, communication and duties within 
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the organization. For the purpose of this study, organizational structure was measured by 
two variables, structural complexity and formalization. Structural complexity was made 
up of two components, horizontal differentiation, and vertical differentiation (Wells, 
Falcone, & Rabe-Hemp, 2003). In the present study, the horizontal differentiation 
variable was measured by the number of divisions or bureaus the police agency has 
created. The number of ranks within the police agency measured the variable vertical 
differentiation. The variable structural complexity was coded by coding vertical and 
horizontal differentiation variable separately. Vertical differentiation was coded as the 
number of ranks. The higher the number of ranks, the higher assumed complexity. 
Horizontal differentiation was coded as 0-3 divisions/bureaus = 1, 4-7 divisions/bureaus 
= 2, and 8 or more divisions = 3. The higher number of established divisions/bureaus, the 
higher implied complexity of the agency. The two variables could have been combined to 
code for structural complexity together but in order to ensure the measures are truly 
measuring the same concept; the variables were coded separately.  
 Formalization is the existence of policies that control operations and procedures 
within an organization. These policies control multiple aspects of law enforcement 
agencies in assisting and constraining an officer’s actions during the course of duty. In 
the survey, respondents were asked to identify, of the four policies listed, if they have 
formally implemented them within their agency. The respondents were asked if they have 
formal policies on the following: hostage situations, use of force, racial profiling, and 
citizen complaints. These four formalization variables were chosen using items from a 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, 2007). The variable formalization was coded as 0=No, and 1=Yes of 
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whether the agencies had these policies in place. These variables were combined into a 
single index for analysis. 
 The second independent variable was police population ratio. For the purpose of 
this study, police population ratio was used to address the measure of the organizational 
size component of the contingency theory framework. Police population ratio was 
defined as the ratio of sworn full time officers to the population. For the purpose of this 
study, the number of sworn full time officers divided by the population multiplied by one 
thousand was assessed to measure the variable police population ratio. Police agency 
administrators were asked on the survey to provide their agency’s demographics in terms 
of the number of full time sworn officers and citizen population in which they serve.  
 The third independent variable that was assessed in the study was risk. Risk was 
defined as the likelihood of a perceived terrorist threat. The risk variable was measured 
by asking law enforcement administrators whether their agency perceived the likelihood 
of a terrorist threat occurring within their jurisdiction. Administrators were asked to 
answer the survey question that pertained to the variable risk was answered through yes 
or no option.   
 Finally, the last independent variable was funding. Funding has become a vital 
part in assisting law enforcement agencies in terrorism prevention (Newman & Clarke, 
2008). The Department of Homeland Security has awarded billions of dollars in grants to 
law enforcement agencies for terrorism prevention (Becker & Schulz, 2011). For the 
purpose of this study, funding was defined as monetary income from internal or external 
sources. Funding was measured by asking police administrators to indicate how much 
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their agency received for terrorism preparedness. The funding variable was then coded as 
0 = no funding, and 1 = yes funding. 
Data Collection 
 This study was a cross sectional, non-experimental design. Nine hundred and two 
law enforcement agencies were surveyed about terrorism preparedness and police 
technologies across 5 states. The study looked at information at one point in time. The 
law enforcement agencies were surveyed using Illinois State University’s in-house survey 
software, Select Survey. The agencies received a postcard asking for their participation in 
the survey. The postcard had the unique survey website listed. Within days, an email was 
sent to the agencies’ email addresses reminding them to take the survey. The link to the 
survey was listed in the email as well. In the present study, the responses were 
confidential meaning that every attempt was made to ensure that survey responses could 
not be linked to the agencies. In order to ensure a decent return rate on the surveys, the 
380 law enforcement agencies that did not have readily available email addresses were 
sent a physical copy of the survey.  
 Research has shown that preparedness is important to law enforcement agencies 
across the United States. Henry (2002) mentioned that the law enforcement mindset was 
shifting to include “the notion of fighting and educating police officers about terrorist 
practices, methods, and activities” (p. 325). However, not all law enforcement agencies 
were shifting the resources to become better prepared for a terrorist attack. Riley and 
Hoffman (1995) found that 38 percent of their surveyed law enforcement agencies had 
some type of terrorism contingency plan in place. Pelfrey (2010) found that only 37 
percent of police agencies actually conducted scenario training. Was this because of the 
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lack of funding, resources, and the number of personnel? It is believed that law 
enforcement agencies across the nation are attempting to become more active in terrorism 
preparedness. Can contingency theory help explain terrorism preparedness? Contingency 
theory has gained a great amount of support in explaining homeland security 
preparedness (Davis et al. 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; 
Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). The current study looked to confirm past research on 
the relationship between risk and terrorism preparedness by looking at county and 
municipal agencies, while determining whether contingency theory (agency size, 
organizational structure, and contingency) played a vital role in explaining whether law 
enforcement agencies were prepared for the next terrorist attack. The next chapter will 
discuss the results of the current study.
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Introduction  
Following September 11th, researchers have attempted to understand terrorism 
preparedness among law enforcement agencies across the nation. Previous studies have 
confirmed that risk is associated with preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; 
Burruss, Giblin, & Schaefer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014), but has not 
examined how agency characteristics impact preparedness. The present study was 
designed to confirm and extend previous terrorism research by answering the following 
research questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the 
necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next terrorist attack?; 
(2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism 
preparedness?  
In this chapter, three different statistical analyses were used to test the relationship 
between preparedness, size, structure, funding, and perceived risk. First, descriptive 
statistics were run for all dependent and independent variables. Second, bivariate analysis 
was used to test the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
Ordinal Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses were used to evaluate the impact the 
independent variables had on preparedness. Multicollinearity diagnostics were employed 
to measure Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics to ensure that all the 
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assumptions of the regression analysis were met. At the end of this chapter, a summary of 
the statistical results were presented.  
Descriptive Statistics  
The dependent variable for this study was preparedness. Preparedness consisted 
of two summed indexes, resources (x=28.39, SD= 5.45) and training (x= 3.85, SD= 2.23). 
The indexes consisted of multiple questions regarding resources of an agency as well as 
type of training and personnel staffed, (See Table 1).  
The first index, resources, consisted of eight questions measured originally at the 
ordinal-interval level through a Likert scale ranging from 1= very poor to 5=very good 
regarding: budget to support emergency operations, communication with other agencies, 
emergency response plan, equipment, knowledge and expertise, large-scale incident 
preparedness, partnership with local responders, and training to respond to emergencies, 
were summed into an index. These factors were analyzed by conducting a factor analysis 
with Varimax rotation. The analysis yielded one factor which explained 54 percent of the 
variance (Eigenvalue = 4.35).  
Table 1 presented the results of the descriptive statistics. Agencies felt they had a 
poor level of preparedness when dealing with a budget to support emergency operations 
(x=2.31, SD=0.99). On average, law enforcement agencies felt they had a good 
communication with other agencies (x=4.33, SD= 0.76). Written emergency response 
plan had a mean value of 3.75 (SD= 0.99).  Of the surveyed agencies, on average, felt 
that their preparedness level was poor to fair in terms of having the proper equipment to 
respond to emergencies (x=2.96, SD=0.99). Agencies’ knowledge and expertise about 
emergency response was fair with a mean value of 3.81 (SD= 0.87). Law enforcement 
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agencies’ felt their level of preparedness of large-scale incidents were fair (x=3.19, 
SD=0.97). Agencies also reported that they had a good level of preparedness in terms of a 
partnership with local responders (x= 4.41, SD=0.82). Agencies’ training preparedness 
level was fair with a mean value of 3.77 (SD=0.91).
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics  
     
Variables n Mean SD Min Max 
Preparedness (Index)      
Resources 108 28.39 5.45 13.00 39.00 
Budget to support emergency 
operations 
107 2.31 0.99 1 5 
Ability to Communicate w/other 
agencies 
108 4.33 0.76 2 5 
Written Emergency Response plan 107 3.75 0.99 2 5 
Equipment to respond to 
emergencies 
108 2.96 0.99 1 5 
Knowledge and Expertise about 
emergency response  
108 3.81 0.87 1 5 
Level of preparedness for Large-
Scale Incidents 
108 3.19 0.97 1 5 
Partnership W/local responders 107 4.41 0.82 1 5 
Training to respond to emergencies 107 3.77 0.91 1 5 
Training/Personnel (Index) 110 3.85 2.23 0 9 
Participated in Field Training 
Exercises 
110 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Assigned individuals to address 
emergency preparedness 
110 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Created an internal task force 109 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Created Specialized Units  110 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Increased number of staff 
dedicated to emergency 
preparedness 
110 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Participated in table-top training 
exercises  
109 0.66 0.48 0 1 
Trained personnel on emergency 
response 
110 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Identified training opportunities  109 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Scheduled training for terrorism 
related incidents  
109 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Structural Complexity       
Number of Bureaus/Divisions 
(Horizontal) 
103 1.11 0.67 .00 3.00 
Number of rank levels (Vertical) 104 3.88 1.99 0 10 
Formalization (Index) 104 3.23 1.02 .00 4.00 
Police Population Ratio 101 1.25 0.95 .00 6.67 
Risk 113 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Funding 99 0.11 0.31 .00 1.00 
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The second index of the preparedness variable was training/personnel. The 
category consisted of nine questions regarding: participation in field training exercises, 
individuals assigned to address emergency preparedness, created an internal task force, 
created specialized units, increased the number of personnel dedicated to emergency 
preparedness, table-top training, training opportunities, and scheduling training for 
terrorism related incidents. The questions were measured through yes (1) or no (0) 
responses. The variables were factor analyzed using factor analysis with Varimax 
rotation. The analysis initially yielded two factors. Once analyzing the factor loadings, 
three variables: created an internal task force, created specialized units, and increased 
number of personnel dedicated to emergency preparedness, were removed from the index 
for the multivariate analyses. The factor analysis was conducted again in which it 
produced one factor that explained 46 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.74). 
The mean value for whether an agency participated in field training exercises was 
0.64 (SD= 0.48). Individuals who were assigned to address emergency preparedness had 
a mean value of 0.47 (SD= 0.50). On average agencies did not create an internal task 
force (x= 0.03, SD= 0.16). Many of the surveyed agencies did not create specialized units 
(x= 0.11, SD=0.31). Law enforcement agencies, on average, did not increase the number 
of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness (x=0.11, SD=0.31) (See Table 1). Agencies 
that participated in table-top training exercises had a mean value of 0.66 (SD=0.48). On 
average, agencies were more likely to train personnel on emergency response (x=0.78, 
SD=0.42). Of the surveyed agencies just over half conveyed that they had identified 
training opportunities (x=0.56, SD=0.50). Agencies who had scheduled training for 
terrorism related incidents had a mean value of 0.51 (SD=0.50).  
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For measuring the influence of terrorism preparedness, five independent variables 
were examined: structural complexity, formalization, police population ratio, risk, and 
funding. First, structural complexity was measured by the number of bureaus or divisions 
an agency had (x=1.11, SD=0.67) along with the number of rank levels within the agency 
(x=3.88, SD=1.99). Second, formalization was measured by whether an agency had 
policies on use of force (x=0.97, SD= 0.17), racial profiling (x=0.78, SD=0.42), citizen 
complaints (x=0.87, SD=0.33), and hostage situations (x=0.63, SD=0.49). These 
variables were first analyzed using the factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The 
analysis produced one factor explaining 50 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.00). 
Next, a summed formalization index was created, with a mean value of 3.23 (SD=1.02). 
Across the surveyed agencies, on average the agencies had implemented the above 
policies. Next, police population ratio was measured by the number of full time sworn 
officers divided by the population times one thousand (x=1.25, SD=0.95). Overall, police 
population ratio indicates that there is at least one full time officer per one thousand 
citizens served. Risk was measured by whether an agency perceived the likelihood of a 
terrorist threat occurring within their jurisdiction (x=0.14, SD= 0.35). Finally, funding 
was measured in US dollars but was coded to become a dichotomous variable and had a 
mean value of 0.11 (SD= 0.31).  
In response to the second research question, table 2 shows the frequencies for the 
resources variable. It was evident that of the responding agencies they felt most confident 
in their level of preparedness with their partnerships (n=60, 56.1%) and communication 
with other agencies (n=53, 49.1%) as many responded with 5-point ratings. This was 
consistent with the findings of Schaefer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009). On the other hand, 
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41.1 percent (n=44) of the agencies were not confident in their emergency operations 
budget. Agencies rated themselves as having a fair level of preparedness for large-scale 
incidents (n=46, 42.6%) along with having the necessary equipment to respond to 
emergencies (n=46, 42.6%). This was an improvement from Schaefer, Burruss, and 
Giblin’s (2009) finding of agencies ranking themselves less-than-adequate in terms of 
having the necessary equipment for emergency operations. Law enforcement agencies 
rated themselves as having a good level of knowledge and expertise about emergency 
response (n=51, 47.2%). This could be explained bythe fact that many agencies felt that 
they have a good preparedness level when dealing with training to respond to 
emergencies (n=45, 42.1%). Forty-four agencies reported having a good level of 
preparedness in terms of having a written emergency response plan in place (41.1%). 
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Table 3 shows the percentages of agencies responding to questions within the 
training/personnel variable. Of the 110 agencies that responded to whether their agency 
had created specialized units, 98 agencies had not created specialized units at the time of 
the survey (89.1%). This lack of implementation could have been due to budget restraints 
as well as available personnel. As noted in table 3, many agencies stated that they did not 
have an adequate budget to support emergency operations. Of the reporting agencies, 
97.2 percent of them did not form an internal task force (n=106). About half the agencies 
responding did assign individuals in their department to oversee and address emergency 
preparedness (n=58, 52.7%). However, there were 52 agencies that did allocate personnel 
Table 2  
Frequencies for Resources Variable  
  Percentages of Agencies 
Aspect of Response as… 
 
 
 
 
n 
(1) 
Very Poor 
(2) 
Poor 
(3) 
Fair 
(4) 
Good 
(5) 
Very 
Good 
Partnership with other local 
responders 
107 1.9 
(2) 
0.9 
(1) 
7.5 
(8) 
33.6 
(36) 
56.1 
(60) 
Ability to communicate with 
other agencies  
108 0.0 
(0) 
1.9 
(2) 
12.0 
(13) 
37.0 
(40) 
49.1 
(53) 
Written Emergency Response 
Plan 
107 0.0 
(0) 
15.0 
(16) 
19.6 
(21) 
41.1 
(44) 
24.3 
(26) 
Training to Respond to 
Emergencies  
107 1.9 
(2) 
4.7 
(5) 
29.9 
(32) 
42.1 
(45) 
21.5 
(23) 
Level of Preparedness for Large-
Scale Incidents  
108 5.6 
(6) 
14.8 
(16) 
42.6 
(46) 
29.6 
(32) 
7.4 
(8) 
Knowledge and Expertise about 
Emergency Response  
108 1.9 
(2) 
3.7 
(4) 
26.9 
(29) 
47.2 
(51) 
20.4 
(22) 
Equipment to Respond to 
Emergencies  
108 9.3 
(10) 
18.5 
(20) 
42.6 
(46) 
25.9 
(28) 
3.7 
(4) 
Budget to Support Emergency 
Operations  
107 21.5 
(23) 
41.1 
(44) 
24.3 
(26) 
11.2 
(12) 
1.9 
(2) 
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to address preparedness (47.3%). The data also showed that law enforcement agencies 
were not likely to increase the number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness 
(n=98, 89.1%). It was found that 51.4 percent of agencies scheduled some type of 
training for terrorism related incidents (n=56) while 48.6 percent did not attempt to 
schedule training (n=53). In contrast to the lack of individuals assigned to address 
emergency response, an overwhelmingly majority of agencies had trained personnel in 
emergency response within their department (n=86, 78.2%). Fifty-six percent of the 
responding departments confirmed that they had identified training opportunities (n=61). 
When it came to training, 63.6 percent of agencies participated in field training exercises 
(n=70) while 66.1 percent participated in table-top exercises (n=72) respectfully.  
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Table 3  
Frequencies for Training Variable 
   Percentage of Agencies 
Answering… 
Since September 11th have you: n Yes No 
Created specialized units  110 10.9 
(12) 
89.1 
(98) 
Created an internal task force  109 2.8 
(3) 
97.2 
(106) 
Assigned individuals to address emergency 
preparedness 
110 47.3 
(52) 
52.7 
(58) 
Increased number of staff dedicated to emergency 
preparedness  
110 10.9 
(12) 
89.1 
(98) 
Scheduled training for terrorism related incidents  109 51.4 
(56) 
48.6 
(53) 
Trained personnel on emergency response  110 78.2 
(86) 
21.8 
(24) 
Identified training opportunities  109 56.0 
(61) 
44.0 
(48) 
Participated in field training exercises  110 63.6 
(70) 
36.4 
(40) 
Participated in table-top exercises  109 66.1 
(72) 
33.9 
(37) 
 
Bivariate Analysis 
Using correlations, a bivariate analysis was conducted to determine significant 
relationships among the variables. Of the independent variables, four variables had a 
significant association with the dependent variable, preparedness (training): formalization 
(r =.370, p<.01), number of rank levels (r =.587, p<.01), number of divisions/bureaus (r 
=.419, p<.01), and funding (r = .337, p<.01) There were four independent variables with 
a significant association with preparedness (resources): formalization (r =.342, p<.01), 
funding (r =.356, p<.01), number of rank levels (r =.371, p<.01), and number of 
divisions/bureaus (r =.300, p<.01) (See Table 4).  
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Table 4 also shows correlations among four independent variables. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient showed that number of divisions/bureaus and police population 
ratio had a significant but a negative weak relationship, (r = -.209, p<.05). The number of 
divisions/bureaus was positively associated with formalization (r = .368, p<.01). Risk 
was shown to have a weak but positive correlation with the number of divisions/bureaus, 
(r = .201, p<.01). The number of rank levels was shown to have a positive, moderate 
relationship with the number of divisions/bureaus (r =.566, p<.01). Risk was found to 
have a weak but positive relationship with the number of rank levels (r = .214, p<.05). 
The number of rank levels was also found to have weak, significant relationships with 
formalization (r = .282, p<.01) and funding (r = .367, p<.01). Table 4 also indicated that 
funding had a positive yet weak relationship to the number of divisions (r = .304, p<.01) 
and risk (r =.225, p<.05).
  
5
4
Table 4  
Correlation Matrix for Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Preparedness (Training)  1        
2. Preparedness (Resources) .531** 1       
3. Number of Rank Levels .587** .371** 1      
4. Formalization .370** .342** .283** 1     
5. Funding .337** .356** .367** .104 1    
6. Number of Divisions/Bureaus .419** .300** .566** .368** .304** 1   
7. Risk .174 .006 .214* .085 .225* .201* 1  
8. Police Population Ratio  -.099 -.190 -.178 .017 -.090 -.209* -.101 1 
**p<.01, *p<.05         
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Multicollinearity Diagnostics  
Before running the OLS regression analysis, frequencies and distributions were 
checked for all the variables. After checking the frequencies and distributions, the 
regression analysis was conducted. To answer research question two, two separate 
regression models had to be run due to the dependent variable consisting of two summed 
indexes. For each dependent variable multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and normal distribution were examined to ensure regression assumptions 
were met.  
Multicollinearity occurs when variables are highly correlated with each other. 
This can cause the decrease of explanation of the independent and dependent variables by 
lowering the R2. There are multiple ways to examine multicollinearity. One way to check 
this was by observing the correlation matrix on the regression output. If the bivariate 
correlation was too high, it would have been above 0.70. In terms of the current study 
none of the correlations reached 0.70. The highest correlation was .58. Another way to 
check for multicollinearity was to inspect the collinearity diagnostics that SPSS supplies 
on the regression output. Table 5 presents the results from the multicollinearity 
diagnostics.   
Table 5  
Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
Variables  Tolerance VIF 
Funding .82 1.23 
Divisions .55 1.81 
Formalization  .82 1.23 
Police Population Ratio .93 1.08 
Rank Levels  .62 1.62 
Risk .90 1.11 
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If multicollinearity existed, the tolerance would have approach zero. As can be 
seen in table 5, no multicollinearity exists. The last way to check for multicollinearity 
was by observing the VIF. If the VIF approached 2.0 or higher, there was a model 
problem and multicollinearity was present. The current study variables had a range of 
VIF from 1.08 to 1.81 as seen in table 5. This suggested that there was an absence of 
multicollinearity in the present variables.  
Heteroscedasticity was tested by conducting the Time Honored Method of 
Inspection (THMI). The THMI was analyzed for a funneling effect on the scatter plot. 
The results showed that the width of the band was mostly uniform from end to end with 
no funneling effect detected. In order to test for autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic was conducted. When the Durbin-Watson statistic approaches 2.0 it generally 
indicates that the variable was independent. The Durbin-Watson associated with the 
current study was 1.75 and 1.96 respectively. This suggests that there was no 
autocorrelation. A Normal P-Plot was conducted to establish that the variables were 
normally distributed. The closer the plot was to the line, the better. The P-Plot for this 
study was very close to the line. This indicated that the variables were normally 
distributed. Cook’s D, DFFITS, and DFBETAS were checked to ensure they did not 
exceed one. There were no variables that did not exceed one. Therefore, it was 
determined that outliers were not a major problem in the regression analysis. 
Multivariate Analysis 
In the OLS Regression, a multivariate analysis, two models were included to test 
the statistical effect of funding, formalization, number of divisions, police population 
ratio, number of rank levels, and risk on preparedness (resources and training). In Model 
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1 examined the effect of funding, divisions/bureaus, formalization, police population 
ratio, rank levels, and risk had on preparedness (training). In Model 2 the same variables 
were tested for their influence on preparedness (resources).  
Table 6  
Results of Training OLS Regression Analysis 
Variables B SE β p 
Preparedness (Training)     
Constant .34 .66   
Funding  .88 .57 .15 .127 
Divisions/Bureaus .08 .31 .03 .808 
Formalization .46 .19 .22 .020* 
Police Population Ratio .02 .17 .01 .926 
Rank Levels .45 .11 .45 .000** 
Risk .10 .50 .02 .839 
Note. R2 = .40, n = 91 
**p < .01, *p < .05 
 
    
Table 6 presented the results of the training OLS Regression analysis. Two 
variables were significant in predicting the dependent variable. The first variable that was 
a significant predictor was formalization (β=.22, p<.05). Essentially, agencies that had 
policies (formalization) implemented were more likely to believe that they would be 
prepared than agencies that did not have policies in place. The strongest predictor of 
training was number of rank levels (β=.45, p< .01). The more rank levels an agency had, 
the more likely an agency perceived that they would be prepared for a terrorist attack. 
Lastly, the model was found to be statistically significant and explained 40 percent of the 
variance (R2=.40, n=91) (See table 6). 
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Table 7  
Results of Resources OLS Regression Analysis  
Variables  B SE β p 
Constant  24.78 1.96   
Funding 5.45 1.68 .34 .002** 
Divisions/Bureaus .70 .92 .10 .450 
Formalization .71 .57 .13 .218 
Police Population Ratio -.63 .50 -.12 .215 
Rank Levels  .34 .32 .13 .284 
Risk -2.77 1.47 -.19 .064a 
Note. R2 = .26, n=91 
**p < .01, *p < .05, ap < .10 
 
Table 7 presents the Resources OLS Regression analysis. There was only one 
statistically significant predictor of preparedness. Funding (β=.34, p< .01) was found to 
be the strongest predictor. Law enforcement agencies that had funding for 
counterterrorism operations were more likely to have the necessary resources for 
terrorism preparedness. Risk (β=-.19, p< .10) was a marginally significant predictor of 
preparedness (resources). However, the model was found to be statistically significant as 
it explained 26 percent of the variance (R2=.26, n=91) (See table 7). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, several analyses were utilized in which they presented important 
predictors of the dependent variable, preparedness. First, the bivariate correlations found 
statistically significant relationships among the variables. Second, the assumption of the 
regression equation were tested and confirmed. The VIF and tolerance scores showed no 
multicollinearity issues. Finally, the OLS regression was used to establish the impact the 
independent variables had on preparedness. Formalization and the number of rank levels 
were found to have a positive effect on the preparedness (training). In the second model, 
funding was the only variable to have a positive effect on preparedness (resources). On 
the other hand, risk had a negative effect on preparedness (resources). In the next chapter, 
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the findings from the present study are discussed in greater detail along with implications 
and limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER VI  
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
Law enforcement agencies today play a vital role in terrorism prevention. There 
are many factors in understanding terrorism preparedness among law enforcement 
agencies. In past research, risk has been identified as the leading factor in driving 
terrorism preparedness (Davis et al. 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 
2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). For example, 
Giblin, Burruss, and Schafer (2014) found that “agency leaders who perceive their risk to 
be higher…are more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness” (p.46). On the 
other hand, institutional influences have also been found to play a role in terrorism 
prevention (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Burruss, Giblin, and Schaefer (2010) 
found that the “influence of professional publications, associations, and peers 
[institutional pressures] were strongly related with greater levels of homeland security 
preparedness” (p.96). The contingency theory asserts that an organization adapts to their 
environment through organizational structure and contingencies in order to remain a high 
level of performance (Donaldson, 2007). The current thesis looked to assess the state of 
fit within law enforcement agencies and to identify any trends within the region surveyed.  
Utilizing the contingency theory as a framework, the current study expanded on 
current research of terrorism preparedness by conducting an exploratory analysis to 
answer the following questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe 
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they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next 
terrorist attack? (2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk 
influence terrorism preparedness? To answer these research questions, bivariate and 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analyses were employed. The statistical results 
and their implications are discussed below. 
Discussion 
This study confirmed and extended previous research on terrorism preparedness 
in law enforcement agencies. One major finding of the current study was that risk was a 
predictor of preparedness. Although risk was significant, it was a weak predictor of 
preparedness compared to previous studies. Another finding of the study was that 
contingency theory did assist in exploring terrorism preparedness, as organizational 
structure and contingencies drove preparedness.  
According to Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009), most law enforcement agencies 
were confident in their communication and partnership capacities. The current results 
confirm this finding. In other words, law enforcement agencies reported having a very 
good open line of communication and partnerships with outside agencies. In past 
terrorism literature, communication and cooperation with outside agencies was reported 
as a struggle or nonexistent. Downing (2009) claimed there were “turf battles and need 
for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement community” (p.3). 
As Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin’s (2009) finding and the current study’s finding, 
communication and cooperation have greatly improved.  
For an agency to have a good level of terrorism preparedness, one component is 
essential, equipment. According to Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009), more than half of 
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the agencies surveyed responded with “less-than-adequate” equipment for emergency 
operations. The current thesis found that of the agencies surveyed, close to half 
communicated that they had a ‘fair’ level of preparedness in terms of equipment needed 
for emergency operations. This was an improvement from Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin’s 
(2009) findings.  
Research in the past has identified risk as a predictive factor in determining 
terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies (Davis et al. 2004; Davis, 
Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, 
Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). The data from the current study suggested that risk had a 
negative effect on terrorism preparedness. However, in the current thesis, risk proved to 
be a marginally significant predictor of terrorism preparedness. One reason for this result 
may lie with pressures facing the agency. According to Haynes and Giblin (2014), all 
agencies face some type of pressure to address homeland security tasks. For example, law 
enforcement agencies face the pressure to take on homeland security obligations, but 
additional pressures (i.e., funding, organizational structure, etc.) may hinder them from 
addressing homeland security concerns in a timely manner. Another possible reason that 
risk was a weak predictor could have been due to the small sample size. Overall, the 
number of useable cases for this study was around 115. A larger sample may have 
produced more robust findings.  
In the current study, funding was a predictor of resources. This finding was 
consistent with what one would expect, agencies were increasing their budget to increase 
the resources they can acquire. This confirms Davis et al.’s (2004) finding that funding is 
related to preparedness. According to Davis et al. (2004), when there is an increase of 
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external funding law enforcement agencies are more likely to increase their resources to 
focus on terrorism preparedness. On the other hand, Burruss et al. (2010) stated that 
agencies “did not appear to be adopting practices in response to the lure of external 
funding” (p.95). The current data suggested that law enforcement agencies were adopting 
practices in response to the amount of funding they receive for counterterrorism 
operations. The increase in funding could have been due to the amount of 
counterterrorism grants being issued to law enforcement agencies since September 11th. 
In 2011 alone, the DHS awarded over $2 billion in counterterrorism grants (Becker & 
Schulz, 2011). Overall, a law enforcement agency that received external funding for 
counterterrorism were more likely to focus on resources for terrorism preparedness than 
those who do not. 
Contingency theory states that an organization adapts to its environment to 
accomplish a fit between structure and contingencies. For the purpose of this study, 
structure was measured by structural complexity (i.e., number of ranks and number of 
divisions/bureaus) and formalization (i.e., policies). Donaldson (2007) claimed that 
organizations strive to be fit so they can enjoy a high level of performance. In the current 
thesis, findings suggested that the variables formalization and number of rank levels had 
a positive effect on training. This means the more policies an agency implemented the 
more likely they focused on training opportunities for their personnel. Also, the more 
rank levels a law enforcement agency had, the more likely the agency provided 
counterterrorism training for their employees. As stated before, contingency theory 
hinges on the balance of organizational structure (i.e., formalization & diversification) 
and its contingencies (i.e., organizational size, diversification, risk, funding) in order for 
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an organization to retain a high performance (i.e., preparedness). The current findings 
suggested that contingency theory was a good framework for exploring terrorism 
preparedness. The data from the current study showed that the organizational structure 
component of contingency theory did drive training, which was a component of the 
dependent variable, preparedness. On the other side, risk and funding, contingency 
components of the theory, were shown to drive resources of the dependent variable. 
Therefore it could be concluded that contingency theory explained terrorism preparedness 
among law enforcement agencies, confirming past research (Davis et al., 2004, 2006; 
Schaefer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss et al., 2010). 
Limitations  
The study’s findings should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind. 
First, not all law enforcement agencies have a readily available email address for public 
consumption. This became a problem as the surveys were intended to be electronic. Of 
the original 902 agencies selected for the study, only 522 agencies had public email 
addresses. The remaining 380 agencies without an email address were mailed a paper 
copy of the survey.  
Second, there were time constraints with this study. The survey was live only for 
a few months. It would have been ideal to have the survey live for at least 4 to 5 months 
before closing it for analysis. Third, there was a small return rate on the surveys. The 
researcher only had 115 usable cases for analysis out of the original 902 sample size. This 
gave the researcher a 12.74 percent return rate. Fourth, due to the small return rate and 
the lack of the bigger law enforcement agency respondents, generalizability cannot be 
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established. Finally, of the responding agencies, not all of the data received was 
complete. This was because agencies could to skip questions they did not want to answer.    
Implications and Conclusion 
Based on the findings of the current thesis a handful of implications can be drawn. 
First, law enforcement agencies felt they have a good level of terrorism preparedness 
given the resources they were able to acquire. Overall, this meant that agencies were able 
to obtain the necessary counterterrorism resources they needed to be prepared. Second, 
although agencies were locating resources, their organizations were not implementing a 
large number of training opportunities for their officers. Just over half of the agencies had 
scheduled training for terrorism related incidents. However, this finding shows that 
agencies were attempting to move in the direction of acquiring a higher level of terrorism 
preparedness. In answering the first research question, law enforcement agencies believe 
they have enough training and resources to respond and or prevent the next terrorist 
attack.  
Next, based on the results of the current study, risk and funding drive whether an 
agency was able to obtain the necessary resources. Also, formalization and a portion of 
the structural complexity drives whether an agency attained counterterrorism training. 
Overall, contingency theory helped explain terrorism preparedness among law 
enforcement agencies. This finding confirmed previous studies stating that contingency 
theory assists in explaining homeland security preparedness (Davis et al. 2004, 2006; 
Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Finally, in 
answering the second research question, agency size did not influence terrorism 
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preparedness. However, perceived risk, funding and structure were found to have an 
influence on the level of preparedness.  
The current study found that law enforcement agencies’ level of preparedness was 
driven by risk, funding, formalization, and the number of rank levels. However, agencies 
felt their level of preparedness with acquiring the necessary equipment needed for 
emergency operations was fair. It was concluded that law enforcement agencies believed 
they had the necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to a terrorist 
attack. The current results concluded that the theoretical framework helps explain 
terrorism preparedness. Future researchers should continue examining terrorism 
preparedness through the training and resources variables. More specifically, researchers 
should examine more specific influential factors that drive an agencies preparedness level 
through qualitative research that can capture a more in-depth explanation of an agency’s 
terrorism preparedness decisions. 
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APPENDIX  
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PREPAREDNESS  
SURVEY 
Is it likely that you will have a terrorist attack within your jurisdiction in the next 5 years?  
1   YES   
2   NO 
 
IF YES, which does your agency perceive as an immediate threat? (Circle all that apply)  
1   CHEMICAL WARFARE 
2   CYBER-TERRORISM  
3   AGRO-TERRORISM (AGRICULTURE TERRORISM)  
4   BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM  
5   CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES  
6   RADIOLOGICAL THREATS  
7   USE OF MILITARY WEAPONS 
 
Since September 11th have you:  
1   CREATED SPECIALIZED UNITS  
2   CREATED AN INTERNAL TASK FORCE  
3   ASSIGNED INDIVIDUALS TO ADDRESS EMERGENCY  
  PREPAREDNESS  
4   INCREASED NUMBER OF STAFF DEDICATED TO EMERGENCY  
  PREPAREDNESS  
5   SCHEDULED TRAINING FOR TERRORISM RELATED INCIDENTS  
6   TRAINED PERSONNEL ON EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
7   IDENTIFIED TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES  
8   PARTICIPATED IN FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES  
9   PARTICIPATED IN TABLE-TOP EXERCISES  
10   NONE OF THE ABOVE 
 
Please enter the number of officers in your agency trained in counterterrorism.  
  
 ______________________ OFFICERS 
 
Does your agency have an active cooperation with other agencies for the purpose of 
terrorism-related operations?  
1   YES 
2   NO  
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IF YES, what agencies do you actively cooperate with for the purpose of terrorism-
related operations?  
1   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS (FBI) 
2   LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES  
3   FUSIONS CENTERS  
4   FIRE SERVICES  
5   STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES  
6   EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS)  
7   OTHER STATE AGENCIES  
8   OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES 
9   DO NOT HAVE ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH OUTSIDE  
  AGENCIES  
Has your agency ever provided information to a fusion center?  
1   YES 
2   NO 
Does your agency participate in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)?  
1   YES 
2   NO 
 
Does your agency have designated personnel to act as liaisons to other agencies on 
counterterrorism issues?  
1   YES  
2   NO 
 
How much money did your agency receive for counterterrorism operations (i.e., training, 
equipment, personnel, etc.) last year?  
 
 $_____________________________ 
 
From your perspective of your agency, please rate your agency’s level of preparedness 
for the following critical incident responses: (Circle your answers)  
  
 Partnership with other local responders:  
      
VERY POOR         POOR         FAIR         GOOD       VERY GOOD 
 
Ability to communication with other agencies:  
 
VERY POOR         POOR         FAIR         GOOD       VERY GOOD  
 
 
Written emergency response plan:  
 
VERY POOR        POOR          FAIR         GOOD       VERY GOOD  
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Training to respond to emergencies:  
 
VERY POOR       POOR           FAIR          GOOD         VERY GOOD  
 
Level of preparedness for large-scale incidents:  
 
VERY POOR       POOR          FAIR           GOOD         VERY GOOD  
 
Knowledge and expertise about emergency response:  
 
VERY POOR       POOR         FAIR           GOOD       VERY GOOD  
 
Equipment to respond to emergencies:  
 
VERY POOR        POOR      FAIR           GOOD        VERY GOOD  
 
Budget to support emergency operations:  
 
VERY POOR        POOR        FAIR        GOOD          VERY GOOD 
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Your Agency 
 
How many sworn/nonsworn officers does your agency employ?  
 
   FULL TIME______________ 
Sworn Officers: 
   PART TIME______________ 
 
   FULL TIME_______________ 
Nonsworn Officers:  
   PART TIME______________ 
 
How many rank levels (line officer, sergeant. Lieutenant, etc.) does your agency have?  
 
 __________________________________ 
 
How many divisions/bureaus does your agency have?  
 
 _________________________________ 
 
Roughly, how many citizens does your agency serve?  
 
 _________________________________ 
 
Would you describe your jurisdiction as primarily:  
1 RURAL 
2 SUBURBAN  
3 URBAN  
4 OTHER  
 PLEASE EXPLAIN: ____________________________________ 
 
Does your agency have a WRITTEN counterterrorism policy/plan?  
1 YES  
2 NO  
Does your agency have formal policies on the following: (please circle your answer)  
USE OF FORCE ……………………….. YES NO 
RACIAL PROFILING…………………. YES NO  
CITIZENS COMPLIANCE…………….. YES NO 
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS……………… YES NO 
 
